Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency

"Thomas Mockaitis's analysis places the question of continued U.S. engagement in Iraq into the historical and strategic context in which it belongs. It is must reading for anyone in a leadership or staff position grappling with the difficult and complex national security issues of our time. Most of all, it should be read by our elected officials, most of whom have little or no foreign policy or national security experience." -- Colonel Christopher Holshek, U.S. Army, Civil Affairs "Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency successfully weaves together issues of counterinsurgency doctrine in the U.S. military, the politics of the global war on terror, and the history of the war in Iraq as it is currently understood. While no one with an opinion on these issues will agree with all of Tom Mockaitis's conclusions, there is no better single volume analyiss of the topics addressed." -- Lieutenant Colonel Rod A. Coffey, U.S. Army "Mockaitis grasps the dominance of unconventional warfare in the 21st century and illustrates the lack of understanding and acceptance of this fact by America's military culture and political system. He explains how our western way of war prevails up to, and including, the current conflict in Iraq. His analysis is compelling--that the U.S. must adapt to the kind of conflict we find on the ground, not try to fight what we wish it to be to the detriment of time, loss of life, and mission success. A must-read for those in conflict, those prosecuting war, and advocates of national security preparedness." -- General David L. Grange, USA (Ret) now President and CEO, McCormick Tribune Foundation

Mockaitis begins by providing a working definition of counterinsurgency that distinguishes it from conventional war while discussing the insurgents' uses of terror as a method to support their broader strategy of gaining control of a country.

Mockaitis begins by providing a working definition of counterinsurgency that distinguishes it from conventional war while discussing the insurgents' uses of terror as a method to support their broader strategy of gaining control of a country. Insurgent movements, he notes, use terror far more selectively than do terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, which kills indiscriminately and is more than willing to produce mass casualties. Such methods stand in stark contrast to the American approach to armed conflict, which is more ideally suited to pragmatic culture leery of involvement in protracted foreign wars and demands immediate results. Within this context, Mocktaitis examines the conflict in Iraq, from post conflict troubles with Saddam in the early 1990s, to pre-invasion planning in 2003. He then moves into a discussion of the rise of insurgent movements and the challenges they posed in the aftermath of the fighting, tracing the ongoing efforts to shape a doctrine that allows US forces to successfully deal with the growing insurgency. The U.S. military in Iraq faces the most complex counterinsurgency campaign in its history and perhaps the history of modern warfare. At the outset, it confronted as many as 22 different domestic insurgent and foreign terrorist groups in an environment made more difficult by thousands of criminals released by Saddam Hussein. Over the past three years, the conflict has evolved with growing ethnic violence complicating an already difficult security situation. Even the most optimistic assessments predict a continued deployment of significant U.S. forces for at least five years for the country to be stabilized. It remains to be seen whether public opinion will support such a deployment. Mockaitis situates the Iraq War in its broad historical and cultural context. He argues that failure to prepare for counterinsurgency in the decades following the end of the Vietnam War left the U.S. military ill equipped to handle irregular warfare in the streets of Baghdad. Lack of preparation and inadequate troop strength led American forces to adopt a conventional approach to unconventional war. Over-reliance on firepower combined with cultural insensitivity to alienate...read more...