On Believing and Being Convinced

This Element systematically explores the relative fundamentality and degrees of conviction for understanding our doxastic states.

This Element explores the concept of doxastic states, which are belief-like states, including outright and degreed doxastic states. It explains how these states can be reduced to conviction thresholds, the fundamental nature of degrees of conviction, their compatibility with suspending a belief, and how Kant endorsed this theory.Our doxastic states are our belief-like states, and these include outright doxastic states and degreed doxastic states. The former include believing that p, having the opinion that p, thinking that p, being sure that p, being certain that p, and doubting that p. The latter include degrees of confidence, credences, and perhaps some phenomenal states. But we also have conviction (being convinced simpliciter that p) and degrees of conviction (being more or less convinced that p). This Element shows: how and why all of the outright doxastic states mentioned above can be reduced to conviction thresholds; what degrees of conviction fundamentally are (degreed reliance-dispositions); why degrees of conviction are not credences; when suspending a belief is compatible with continuing to believe; and the surprising extent to which Kant endorsed the theory of conviction that emerges in this Element.