Iron Pyrite

Challenges Kripkean orthodoxy; develops Wittgensteinian alternatives in logic, language, and metaphysics; and reassesses fundamental philosophical views.

The book critiques Kripkean ideas, including the rigidity of names, the causal theory of names, the necessity of identity and of origin, the nature of fictional characters, and the approach to the liar paradox. It develops an alternative view on logic, language, and philosophy, close to Wittgenstein’s.

The book critiques positions argued for or assumed by Kripke, developing a largely Wittgensteinian philosophical position. Kripke’s views have shaped analytic philosophy for more than half a century, many becoming common orthodoxy. Ben-Yami, by contrast, criticizes and rejects many central ones. Rigidity of names, if maintained, should be significantly revised; the causal or communication picture of names is rejected; identity is contingent, as is the origin of things; the meaning of kind terms is not a function of any unknown essence; Kripke has failed to provide any example of necessary a posteriori knowledge or to support the concept of metaphysical necessity; his approach to the liar paradox is mistaken; he failed to understand Wittgenstein on rule following; and more. A different approach to logic, language, metaphysics, and philosophy emerges as the book’s critical reflections accumulate.